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I. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure, Respondent Hercules, Inc. ("Hercules") petitions this 
Court for a rehearing. In its August 31, 1990 Opinion, this 
Court misapprehended the Payment Bond Statute, Utah Code Ann, 
S 14-1-1 (1986), the Mechanic's Lien Statute, Utah Code Ann, 
§ 38-1-3 (1988), and the cases cited in support of these statutes 
when it concluded as a matter of law the following three points: 
(1) That the mobile office units constitute 
realty for purposes of the Payment Bond Statutes, Utah Code Ann. 
SS 14-2-1, et seq. (1986) and the Mechanic's Lien Statutes, Utah 
Code Ann. SS 38-1-1 et seq. (1988). 
(2) That Hercules "enter[ed] into a contract" for 
the construction of these mobile office units, as required by the 
Payment Bond Statute, section 14-2-1. 
(3) That the alienability of an owner's property 
interest is not a precondition to the attachment of a mechanic's 
lien. 
Additionally, this Court misapprehended section 14-2-3 
of the Payment Bond Statute and it overlooked a Utah Supreme 
Court decision directly addressing that section. 
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II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE LEASED MOBILE OFFICE UNITS ARE 
PERSONALTY AND HAVE NOT BECOME PART OF 
THE LAND; THEREFORE, THE UNITS ARE 
OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE PAYMENT BOND 
STATUTE AND THE MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE. 
The Opinion concludes that the test set forth in Paul 
Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1279 (Utah 
1982), does not apply to the present case because the issue 
addressed in Mueller is not the issue in this case. Opinion, at 
p. 8. The Court is incorrect for two reasons. 
First, the Utah Supreme Court, in Mueller, clearly 
stated that the Mueller test was to be applied when determining 
whether property is realty or personalty: "In distinguishing 
between real and personal property for statutory lien purposes, 
this Court has adopted a tripartite test. • . ." J_d. at 1283. 
The fundamental issue before this Court in this appeal was 
whether the mobile office units are realty or personalty. 
Contrary to this Court's conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court did 
not limit the applicability of the Mueller test to the issue of 
whether personal property had become an improvement upon land. 
When the Mueller test is applied to this case, the only result 
possible, as the trial court found based upon the evidence it 
heard, is that the mobile trailers are not realty. This Court 
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should reconsider its ruling which purports to turn a purely 
factual issue resolved by the trial court into an issue of law. 
Second, this Court cited Waldorf v. Elliot, 214 Or. 
437, 330 P.2d 355 (1958), in support of its argument that the 
units in question were "buildings" and therefore realty. Opin-
ion, at p. 9. However, the Waldorf court actually used the same 
tripartite test set forth in Mueller to determine whether the 
property in question was realty or personalty. In Waldorf, the 
issue was whether certain grain tanks located on property being 
sold to Mr. and Mrs. Waldorf were personal property and not part 
of the sale, or whether the grain tanks were real property and 
included in the sale. Even though the court considered the tanks 
to be "buildings," that determination did not conclusively 
indicate the buildings were realty. The court said that determi-
nation simply shifted the burden of proof to the party claiming 
the property was personalty to show that it retained that charac-
ter. Id., at 357. Hercules has met that burden of proof; the 
evidence adduced at trial established clearly that the mobile 
office units are personalty. 
Since the Utah Supreme Court in Mueller did not limit 
application of the tripartite test to determine whether personal 
property had become an improvement upon land, and since the 
Waldorf court used the same tripartite test in determining 
whether buildings were realty or personalty, this Court should 
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allow to stand the trial court's ruling based on the evidence 
presented that the Muellev tripartite test was satisfied by 
Hercules and that tne mobile office units are personalty. 
Furthermore, the Waldorf court indicated that the most 
important element in the tripartite test was the intent of the 
parties. It stated: "The tendency found in modern decisions is 
to stress the third test -- that of intention -- making it 
controlling where there is doubt as to the effect of the two 
others [annexation and adaptation]." Jjd. at 357. The intention 
of Hercules and Modulaire was clearly to have these mobile office 
units remain personalty because they anticipated that Modulaire 
would someday remove them from the property. This intention is 
evidenced by the fact that Modular's written quote to Hercules 
for the mobile office unit complex included both setup and 
dismantling charges. (R. 218). Based upon this intention, the 
mobile office units should remain personalty and therefore 
outside the scope of the payment bond and mechanic's lien 
statutes. 
1
 In its Opinion, this Court stated that it "noted the signif-
icant expense that Hercules would incur in removing the build-
ings." There was no evidence in the record that Hercules would 
incur expense in removing the buildings and in fact the testimony 
indicated that there was very little to do on Hercules1 part to 
remove the buildings and, as the record indicates, Modulaire 
would bear the expense of dismantling the units. 
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B. THE LEASE ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN HERCULES 
AND MODULAIRE DID NOT CONSTITUTE "A 
CONTRACT" FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
MOBILE OFFICE UNITS, AS REQUIRED BY 
SECTION 14-2-1. 
At footnote 4, page 7, of the Opinion, this Court 
stated: " [W]e conclude as a matter of law that the leasing 
arrangement [with Modulaire] was such a contract [for the con-
struction of a building]." This Court's conclusion is erroneous 
and overreaching. Space Building Systems, not Hercules, con-
tracted for the construction of the mobile office units. 
Hercules was not a party to that contract nor did it negotiate 
that contract with Wagner. Wagner was a subcontractor of Space 
Building Systems, Space Building Systems was a subcontractor of 
Modulaire, and Modulaire was the lessor of the units. The 
contract between Space Building Systems and Wagner involved 
Hercules only to the extent that Hercules would someday lease the 
mobile office units for which Wagner was providing materials. 
Hercules, therefore, did not contract with Wagner for the con-
struction of the units, as required by the Payment Bond Statute. 
The Court's use of the stipulation at trial as to the 
contractual chain as a basis for its conclusions of law are 
somewhat incredible in light of the fact that parties frequently 
stipulate at trial as to contractual chain to eliminate the need 
for extensive evidence. The mere fact that Hercules stipulated 
that it was in a contractual chain certainly was not meant to 
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demonstrate that it was part ot a construction project, Hercules 
has always maintained that it is nothing more than a lessee of 
mobile trailers. 
C. HERCULES' INTEREST, IF ANY, IN THE 
PROPERTY IS NOT LIENABLE AND COULD NOT 
BE FORECLOSED. 
At page 18 of its Opinion, this Court concluded that 
"alienability of an owner's property interest is not a precondi-
tion to the attachment of a mechanic's lien." However, practi-
cally there is no interest in which Wagner could foreclose to 
satisfy its lien. As discussed in its Brief, the land on which 
the units rest is owned by the United States Navy and could not 
possibly be foreclosed. Furthermore, the mobile office units 
were temporarily placed on the land and are personalty because 
they are not integrated into, affixed to, annexed to, or adapted 
to the land. Consequently, there is no interest that could 
possibly be sold at a sheriff's sale or other judicial sale. 
While it is true that a leasehold interest in realty could 
certainly be liened, it is also certainly true that a leasehold 
interest in personalty could not be liened. 
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D. SECTION 14-2-3 OF THE PAYMENT BOND 
STATUTE AND UTAH CASE LAW DO NOT PROVIDE 
FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES IN AN 
ACTION FOR FAILURE TO OBTAIN A PAYMENT 
BOND. 
This Court reversed the trial court's decision in favor 
of Hercules on Wagner's payment bond cause of action and remanded 
the case to the trial court. Specifically, the court stated: 
Based on the uncontested facts, we remand and 
instruct the trial court to find for Wagner 
and to determine the reasonable value of the 
materials furnished in accordance with 
Section 14-2-2, Wagner's reasonable attorneys 
fees pursuant to Section 14-2-3, and any 
other remedy to which Wagner may be entitled 
under the Payment Bond Statute. 
Opinion dated August 31, 1990, at page 18 (emphasis added). 
Section 14-2-3 of the Payment Bond Statute and a Utah Supreme 
Court decision addressing that statute do not provide for an 
award of attorneys' fees under the circumstances of this case. 
Utah's Payment Bond Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-3 
2 (1986) provides: 
14-2-3. Action on bond to protect mechanics 
and materialmen -- Attorney' s fee -- In any 
action brought upon the bond provided for 
under this chapter the successful party shall 
be entitled to recover a reasonable 
* In the Court's Opinion, it properly applied the Payment Bond 
Statutes in effect in 1986, Utah Code Ann. , S§ 14-2-1 e_t seq. 
(1986). The Utah Legislature repealed Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-3 in 
1987, and amended S 14-2-2 to provide for an award of attorneys1 
fees in an action for failure to obtain a bond: "In an action 
for failure to obtain a bond, the court may award reasonable 
attorneys1 fees to the prevailing party. These fees shall be 
taxed as costs in the action." 
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attorney's fee to be fixed by the court, 
which shall be taxed as costs in the action. 
The statute clearly provides for an award of attorneys' 
fees in an action "brought upon the bond provided for under this 
chapter." However, Hercules obtained no payment bond with 
respect to this project. Wagner's action against Hercules was an 
action to recover for failure to obtain a payment bond pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1 ejt seq. (1986). Since Wagner's action 
was not upon a bond, but was for failure to obtain a bond, the 
Court's award of attorneys' fees to Wagner pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 14-2-3 was inappropriate. 
In a case directly on point, the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld this reasoning in Roberts Investment Co. v. Gibbons & Reed 
Concrete Products Co., 22 Utah 2d 105, 449 P.2d 116 (1969). In 
that case, Gibbons & Reed supplied concrete to construct a 
building that was owned by Roberts. Gibbons & Reed was not paid 
for the full value of its services, so it filed a lien against 
the property and a lawsuit for failure to obtain a payment bond 
pursuant to § 14-2-1, et, seq. Gibbons & Reed also claimed that 
it was entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to § 14-2-3. 
The Utah Supreme Court awarded Gibbons & Reed judgment 
for the amount of the reasonable value of its services provided 
to Roberts. However, it refused to award Gibbons & Reed attor-
neys' fees pursuant to § 14-2-3 because that statute only dealt 
with an action upon the payment bond. The court stated: 
-9-
It should be noted that this section 
[S 14-2-3] does not provide for an attorney's 
fee in the event that a bond is not supplied. 
The Legislature might well have provided for 
an attorney's fee in the event that one who 
was subject to the provisions of the statute 
having failed to supply a bond was obligated 
to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to one who 
was injured by reason of the failure to 
supply a bond. However, the Legislature did 
not so provide. 
22 Utah 2d at 107, 449 P.2d at 118. As of 1986, the Legislature 
had not provided for an award of attorneys' fees in an action for 
failure to obtain a payment bond. J_d. In Roberts, the Utah 
Supreme Court unequivocally stated that this section did not 
apply to an action for failure to obtain a payment bond. 
In short, Hercules did not obtain a payment bond for 
the work performed on the mobile office units owned by Modulaire. 
When Wagner did not get paid by Space Building Systems after 
providing labor and materials to finish the mobile office units, 
Wagner asserted a claim against Hercules for failure to obtain a 
payment bond as required by Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1 e_t seq. 
(1986). This Court's award of attorneys' fees to Wagner pursuant 
to section 14-2-3 was inappropriate because that section clearly 
applies only to actions upon a bond; it does not apply to actions 
for failure to obtain a bond. Moreover, Roberts supports this 
position. This Court should therefore at a minimum amend its 
Opinion and avoid awarding to Wagner erroneously and illegally 
attorneys' fees. 
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III. 
CONCLUSION 
A Petition for Rehearing is appropriate when the 
appellate court has overlooked or misapprehended particular 
points of law. The Court's Opinion misapprehends the Payment 
Bond Statute, section 14-2-1 (1986), the Mechanic's Lien Statute, 
section 38-1-3 (1988), and the cases cited in support of these 
statutes. Additionally, the Opinion misapprehends the attorneys' 
fee provisic of the Utah Payment Bond Statute, S 14-2-3 (1986), 
and it also overlooks a Utah Supreme Court decision interpreting 
that statute. The Court, therefore, should grant a rehearing to 
reconsider its conclusions set forth above. 
DATED this 
^ d a v o f s e p 
tember, 1990. 
J /MES M. "SfcrBdANr 
•—^MARK Q WFPRF.R 
5A TE 
"MARK S. WEBBER 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Hercules, Inc. 
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